This paper shows that utility differences between the selfemployed and employees increase with financial development. This effect is explained not by increased profits but by an increased value of nonmonetary benefits, in particular job independence. We interpret these findings by building a simple occupational choice model in which financial constraints may impede the creation of firms and depress labor demand, thereby pushing some individuals into self-employment for lack of salaried jobs. In this setting, financial development favors a better matching between individual motivation and occupation, thereby increasing entrepreneurial utility despite increasing competition and so reducing profits.
I. Introduction
F ROM a standard economic viewpoint, the choice of becoming an entrepreneur displays some puzzling features. First, it is on average unprofitable: returns to capital are too low and risk too high (Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) . Second, it seems to deliver high utility: entrepreneurs often report higher levels of job satisfaction than employees with similar characteristics (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Hundley, 2001; Benz and Frey, 2004) . A popular explanation of these puzzles posits that being an entrepreneur gives substantial nonmonetary benefits and that, due to financial barriers to entry, entrepreneurs can enjoy utility above market clearing (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998) .
In this paper, we examine this argument by exploring theoretically and empirically how utility differences between entrepreneurs and employees respond to financial development. The aim is to contribute to a better understanding of occupational choices as driven by these utility differences, particularly in relation to market conditions. Analyzing utility differences is a way to highlight that individuals may become entrepreneurs for very different reasons, which can significantly affect their market behaviors. For example, the type of entrepreneur, particularly in terms of motivations and aspirations, is a key predictor of their potential for job creation and growth. 1 Similarly, whether entrepreneurs are driven by push or pull factors is a central determinant of their entry and exit over the business cycle. 2 Hence, understanding entrepreneurs' motivations appears crucial for assessing their contribution to economic development and, ultimately, for guiding policy interventions.
We start by building an occupational choice model in which individuals can choose between becoming an entrepreneur, which requires investing capital and hiring workers, or looking for a job as an employee. The model builds on two main ingredients. 3 First, in addition to profits and wages, individuals also value the nonmonetary dimensions of their job. For example, entrepreneurs may derive utility from being their own boss. 4 In line with the evidence in Fuchs-Schündeln (2009), we assume that individuals may differ in how much they like (or dislike) not having a boss, and so more generally in their (intrinsic) motivation for becoming an entrepreneur.
The second key ingredient is that labor demand is determined by the number of individuals who become entrepreneurs. If there are only a few entrepreneurs, labor demand is low and so is the probability of finding a salaried job. This may push some individuals to become entrepreneurs through lack of better opportunities. 5 It follows that individuals may start their businesses with very different motivations. They may choose to be entrepreneurs, as is typically the case in more developed countries, or they may become entrepreneurs by necessity. A substantial fraction of entrepreneurs in developing countries falls into this category (Reynolds et al., 2002) , and these individuals may be very happy to leave their businesses for a salaried job. 6 We then explore the effects of financial development in this setting. While the relation between financial constraints and occupational choices has received significant attention (see Duflo, 2005, and Levine, 2005 , for recent surveys), we focus on the rather unexplored aspect of how financial development may affect individual utility, in particular the nonmonetary returns from entrepreneurship. As our 274 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS analysis confirms, such returns seem a crucial component of entrepreneurial choices.
In our model, financial development allows some poor individuals to access credit and set up a company, which in turn increases competition and the demand for labor. In this way, the poor and most motivated individuals can become entrepreneurs, while the rich and least motivated individuals are induced to look for a salaried job. It follows that higher levels of financial development are associated with more satisfied entrepreneurs, and this is the case even if financial development increases competition and so reduces profits. In fact, in more financially developed countries, individuals tend to choose to be entrepreneurs because of their motivation rather than for lack of a better job.
These predictions are tested by using individual data on job satisfaction taken from the World Value Surveys, which provide comprehensive household surveys for a large set of countries over two decades. We focus on self-reported levels of job satisfaction in order to account for both monetary and nonmonetary returns from a job, which is crucial in our framework since profits and utility need not move in the same direction. In addition to standard demographic variables, these data provide information on beliefs, personality, and different dimensions of individual jobs, which permits testing whether financial development works through these channels. Finally, although most of the evidence on entrepreneurs' job satisfaction comes from OECD countries, these data cover a wide sample of developing and developed countries. This allows us to draw a broader picture of whether entrepreneurship has different meanings and financial development has different effects according to a country's stage of development.
Our main findings lend support to the predictions of the model. First, descriptive statistics show that entrepreneurs report higher levels of job satisfaction than employees only in more financially developed countries; moreover, in these countries, entrepreneurs tend to report lower income than employees. These patterns are confirmed in a more structured analysis in which we control for a set of individual variables and, most important, country-year fixed effects. It emerges that entrepreneurial utility relative to the utility of the employees increases with financial development. This result is robust to the inclusion of additional macroeconomic variables, accounting, for example, for better institutions or economic perspectives, as well as to the use of alternative measures of financial development. Moreover, this effect appears stronger in less financially developed countries, where many individuals become entrepreneurs by necessity and so many would be happy to switch to salaried employment.
Finally, we explore the question of which mechanisms may underlie this relation. We first note that adding income to the explanatory variables does not change our results. Income appears (as expected) to be a strong determinant of job satisfaction, but higher financial development does not increase entrepreneurs' utility by making them richer. On the other hand, the effect of financial development becomes insignificant once we control for the degree of independence enjoyed in the job. This suggests that higher financial development allows entrepreneurs to enjoy higher nonmonetary benefits, in particular, higher freedom in making decisions in their job. We present our model and theoretical analysis in sections II and III, respectively; section IV describes our data, and section V reports the empirical results; section VI concludes by discussing some policy implications. Omitted proofs and tables are reported in the appendix.
II. The Model
Consider an economy populated by a unitary mass of riskneutral individuals. Each individual is characterized by a type (a, b) , where a describes his initial wealth and b his taste for being an entrepreneur (which for now we simply call motivation). Wealth is drawn from a smooth cumulative distribution function F with density f and motivation from a smooth cumulative distribution function G with density g. These draws are assumed to be statistically independent. In addition, each individual is endowed with one unit of labor, which he may employ for setting up a firm or to work as an employee. We now describe these options in further detail.
A. Options
First, an individual can set up a firm. We assume that each firm produces the same homogeneous good and has the same size: it employs k units of capital and l workers and produces q units of output. The profit is then
where p denotes the price of the good, w denotes workers' wage, and r is the market interest rate. In addition, managing a firm gives utility b. Hence, an individual who sets up a firm enjoys utility
These individuals are called entrepreneurs, and we denote their population share with x 1 . As a second option, an individual can look for a job in one of these firms. If he is hired, he enjoys utility
The population share of workers is denoted with x 2 . If he is not hired, he remains idle and enjoys some utility, which we normalize to 0. 7
B. Markets
There are three markets in our economy: a labor market, a product market, and a credit market. In the labor market, the wage w is bounded below by w, which implies that this market may display excess supply. In this case, each applicant has the same probability of getting a job. While the general spirit of the model would be unchanged if we had market clearing wages, we wish to capture the idea that some persons may be pushed into self-employment as a way to avoid unemployment. As detailed in Section I, this appears to be a prominent case, especially in developing countries. The specific modeling choice is meant to be minimal with respect to this goal; more sophisticated reasons for nonmarket clearing wages are given, for example, in Weiss (1980) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . The number of workers equals firms' demand, so we have
The product market is described by a decreasing inverse demand function,
where Q = x 1 q denotes the total output produced in the economy. The product demand is here taken as exogenous (say, coming from abroad). Again, this is meant to be the simplest way to model a situation in which a larger share of entrepreneurs increases competition in the product market. While one may also think of positive externalities among firms, we will show that, even disregarding them, entrepreneurs may report higher payoffs when more firms are created. 8 Entrepreneurs take the price p as given and inelastically supply their output. The financial market is competitive, the interest rate r is fixed and exogenous, and we normalize it to 1. An individual with wealth a can ask for a loan (k − a) in order to set up a firm. However, ex post moral hazard limits the maximum size of this loan. Since, at cost c, an individual can renege on his loan contract and run away with the money, the required repayment (k − a) cannot exceed c. Hence, only individuals with enough wealth can set up a firm, and we define this lower bound on wealth as
The threshold a * decreases with c, which measures how easy it is to enforce loan contracts and is therefore an indicator of financial development. 9 8 The same effect would occur if the product demand depended on wages, employment, and the amount of aggregate wealth not in invested firms (but not on entrepreneurial profit). 9 Our formalization of financial market imperfections is similar to the one in Banerjee and Newman (1993) . The fact that only sufficiently wealthy individuals get loans can also be derived in a model of moral hazard according to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) or costly screening. While we abstract from issues of optimal financing contract, we notice that condition 5 would be unchanged in the case of equity financing. The latter is, however, likely to play a minor role in our subsequent empirical analysis.
C. Equilibrium
In equilibrium, each individual, given his type, chooses an option in order to maximize his expected utility and the markets function according to equations (3), (4), and (5). In this equilibrium, an individual with wealth lower than a * has no option other than to look for a job as worker. An individual with wealth greater than a * and motivation b prefers to set up a firm if and only if
which implicitly defines a lower bound on b as
Provided that an equilibrium exists, the share of entrepreneurs x 1 is implicitly defined by
This equation also characterizes labor supply (1 − x 1 ) and, by equation (3), the share of workers x 2 = lx 1 . We are then interested in identifying the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in our economy.
III. Analysis
To show that an equilibrium exists and that it is unique, we first note that the right-hand side of equation (7) decreases in b * . In fact, a higher b * leads to a lower share of entrepreneurs x 1 , and so to a higher labor supply (1 − x 1 ) and a higher price p (since total output Q increases in x 1 ). This implies that equation (7) uniquely defines b * .
Moreover, the minimal motivation of those who prefer running a firm increases with the share of entrepreneurs x 1 . In fact, a higher x 1 reduces the incentive to set up a firm because it reduces the price p and increases the demand for workers and so the probability of being hired. This is expressed in the lemma: Lemma 1. The minimal entrepreneurial motivation b * is increasing with the share of entrepreneurs x 1 .
It follows from lemma 1 that the right-hand side of equation (8) decreases in x 1 , and thus equation (8) uniquely defines the share of entrepreneurs x 1 . We summarize with the following proposition:
Proposition 1. An equilibrium exists and is unique. It is defined by equations (3), (5), (7) , and (8).
A. Financial Development, Profits, and Job Satisfaction
We are then interested in analyzing how financial development affects utility differences between entrepreneurs and 276 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS workers. In particular, we consider how these effects may depend on a country's stage of development and how they may differ along monetary and nonmonetary dimensions of individual utility. 10 The average utility of an entrepreneur can be decomposed into the sum of profit, π = pq − wl − rk, and average nonmonetary benefit,
Utility differences are defined as
Differentiating equation (10) with respect to c, we write the effects of financial development on utility differences D as
In order to interpret equation (11), we first note that by relaxing wealth constraints, financial development allows a higher fraction of individuals to pay the cost of setting up a firm. The share of entrepreneurs then increases in financial development, up to the point at which everyone is employed as either a worker or an entrepreneur: x 1 + lx 1 = 1. We show this in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. There exists a level of financial development c * such that the share of entrepreneurs x 1 increases in c for c < c * , and it is x 1 = 1/(1 + l) for all c ≥ c * .
It follows that utility differences between entrepreneurs and workers tend to be higher in more financially developed countries. By equation (6), it must be that for all those who become entrepreneurs,
Given lemma 1, the share of entrepreneurs is low when financial development is low. In this case, many individuals choose to be entrepreneurs even if they would prefer to be workers, since labor demand is low and so the probability of being hired is small. 11 10 Obviously we are considering only the case in which c < k and so financial development may have some effect. 11 The fact that labor market imperfections are less likely to bind in more financially developed countries is due to our assumption that the minimum wage is not correlated to financial development. From a theoretical viewpoint, a positive relation between financial and labor market development is what one would expect in models where moral hazard on the part of workers is the reason for imperfect labor markets (see the references in section IIB) and moral hazard on the part of borrowers is the reason for imperfect access to credit. From an empirical viewpoint, this is a common theme in the literature on labor market imperfections and self-employment (see Addison & Teixeira, 2003 , and the references in note 6), and it will be confirmed in our data too.
Hence, in countries with low financial development, entrepreneurship may come from the need to find a job rather than from the choice of highly motivated individuals. In these countries, then, entrepreneurs need not be more satisfied with their job than employees are. When financial development is high, instead, x 1 = 1/(1+l) and so U 1 ≥ U 2 for all those who become entrepreneurs. This implies that utility differences between entrepreneurs and workers are positive.
We then turn to the effect of financial development on profits and wages. For c < c * , higher financial development increases labor demand, but the wage remains at its minimum w because there is still excess labor supply. Total production also increases (as fewer individuals end up idle), and this reduces price p and so the profit. For c ≥ c * , the share of entrepreneurs is constant, and so is the price, while the wage increases as more people compete to attract workers. This is shown more formally in the next lemma:
Lemma 3. For c < c * , price p decreases with c and wage w is constant at w; for c ≥ c * , price p is constant and wage w increases with c.
Finally, we look at the effects of financial development onb, which represents the nonmonetary dimensions of individual utility. These effects depend on how the minimal motivation b * varies with c. For c < c * , b * increases both as profits decrease (via product market competition) and as the probability of being hired increases. For c ≥ c * , b * still increases (though possibly less than for c < c * ) since labor market competition increases the wage. Hence, financial development allows poor individuals with high motivation to become entrepreneurs and induces those with low motivation to exit and look for jobs as employees. The following proposition summarizes these predictions, which we test in the next section:
a. Entrepreneurs enjoy higher utility than employees only in more financially developed countries. b. Entrepreneurial profits π decrease with financial development. c. Entrepreneurial nonmonetary benefitsb increase with financial development, and this effect may be stronger when financial development is low.
IV. Testing the Model
We are interested in exploring the effects of financial development on the utility of entrepreneurs relative to workers. In particular, in line with the interpretation suggested by the previous model, we look at the effects of financial development on both income and nonmonetary components of individual utility, and we test whether these effects depend on the country's stage of development.
It should already be noted, however, that we are going to estimate the changes in utility within the group of entrepreneurs relative to the group of workers, but the composition of these groups may change with financial development. In other words, we do not estimate the effects on the same individuals, but rather the effects on a representative individual within a group over time and across countries.
A. Data
In most of our analysis, the dependent variable is the selfreported level of job satisfaction. We consider a 1 to 10 index based on the answer to the question, "Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your job?" This variable is taken from the World Value Surveys (WVS) and is available for 46 countries over the period 1981 to 2001. 12 We focus on job satisfaction because we need an indicator with both monetary and nonmonetary returns from a job. Indeed, we will see that income is a major determinant of job satisfaction (which suggests we are not capturing purely nonmonetary returns), but it is not the only determinant of job satisfaction (which suggests we are not capturing purely monetary returns either).
We are interested in exploring job satisfaction of the selfemployed versus employees. As common in survey studies, we classify an individual as self-employed if he or she responded that self-employment represents his or her main activity, as opposed to salaried work. 13 The self-employed represent both own-account entrepreneurs and employers, the vast majority being very small businesses. 14 In relation to typical business statistics, which include only firms beyond some size, which allows a more direct link with occupational choices. Even in highly financially developed countries, the vast majority of new firms are very small (Kerr & Nanda, 2009 ). Moreover, as Blanchflower, Oswald, and Stutzer (2001) argued, self-employment is defined fairly consistently across countries.
For each individual, information is also provided on demographic characteristics, income, employment status, and several variables describing beliefs, personality, and different dimensions of his or her job. In total, we have 50,978 individual observations for full-time employees and 7,010 for the self-employed, divided into 88 country-year groups.
Financial development has a rather precise theoretical definition, but its measure presents several challenges (see Levine, 2005 , for a discussion). 15 In our analysis, we employ the most commonly used indicator in the literature on finance and growth: the level of domestic credit to the private sector, in percentage of GDP. The variable is taken from the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank. In our sample, it displays a considerable variation both within and across countries, ranging from 1.68 (Poland, 1989 ) to 195.98 (Japan, 1990 .
This indicator seems well suited for our purposes. It reflects the availability of bank credit, a fundamental ingredient for facilitating access to credits for individuals or very small firms. On the other hand, private credits represent an outcome of financial development; hence, we will check the robustness of our analysis with an indicator of inputs of the financial system: privately owned banks. In particular, following Aghion, Fally, and Scarpetta (2007), we employ a measure of the percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks.
Finally, we use other macroeconomic variables such as per capita GDP, GDP growth, unemployment, minimum wage, regulation, legal origin, and trust. A more detailed description and summary statistics of all our variables can be found in the appendix.
V. Empirical Evidence

A. Descriptive Evidence
As suggested by our model, the self-employed need not enjoy greater utility than the employees: in less financially developed countries, self-employment can simply be a way to avoid unemployment. To get a first idea of where the status of self-employed is a significant determinant of job satisfaction, we estimate the following equation separately for each country and year:
The dependent variable U i denotes individual job satisfaction, X i is a set of individual variables including gender, age, agesquared, education, marital status, and SE i is a dummy equal to 1 if i is self-employed. If the self-employed enjoy higher utility in a given country and year, then the coefficient γ should be positive. Table 1 reports the estimates of the coefficient γ for each country and year. It is clear that the self-employed are not always more satisfied than the employees, but this tends to be the case only in more developed countries. Moreover, the results remain basically unchanged if income is included in the set of controls X i (columns 4-6). In fact, the set of countries and years in which the self-employed enjoy higher utility becomes slightly larger, which already suggests that income differentials are not the explanation behind differences in job satisfaction.
In order to better highlight these relationships, we construct the following variables. The variable HAPPY is equal to the estimated coefficient γ in equation (13), weighted by the inverse of its standard error. We also run a similar regression with income as dependent variable in equation (13). Given this regression, we construct the dummy RICH, which 278 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS This table reports the results of ordered probit regressions of job satisfaction on a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is self-employed. Columns 1 and 4 report the estimated coefficients. In columns 1-3, the controls are gender, age, age squared, education, and marital status. In columns 4-6, income is also included in the controls. NA indicates that no observation on income is available for that country in that year. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are reported in bold. The table reports partial correlation coefficients. The asterisk indicates significance at the 1% level. HAPPY is equal to the estimated coefficient on self-employment, weighted by the inverse of its standard error, in an ordered probit regression with job satisfaction as dependent variable. RICH is equal to the estimated coefficient on self-employment, weighted by the inverse of its standard error, in an ordered probit regression with income as dependent variable. All regressions include gender, age, age squared, education, and marital status as controls.
is again equal to the estimated coefficient γ weighted by the inverse of its standard error. 16 As shown in Table 2 , the variable HAPPY is positively correlated with financial development, GDP per capita, and it is negatively correlated with RICH, the level of unemployment (UNEMPL) and whether there is a mandatory minimum wage (MINWAGE). In accordance with our model, the selfemployed enjoy higher utility than the employees in countries with high financial development and low labor market imperfections. Moreover, in these countries, the self-employed tend to have a lower income than the employees do.
B. Job Satisfaction and Financial Development
The previous results suggest that utility differences are not due to financial market imperfections. We now explore this argument more systematically. We first estimate the equation 16 Our results are unchanged if instead we define HAPPY and RICH by considering only statistically significant coefficients. (14) where U i,c,t denotes the reported job satisfaction for an individual i in country c and year t; X i,c,t is a set of individual variables including gender, age, age-squared, education, marital status, and employment status; I c,t is a country-year dummy, FD c,t is the level financial development, and SE i,c,t is a dummy equal to 1 if i is self-employed; finally, ε i,c,t is the error term. 17 Equation (14) follows the spirit of Rajan & Zingales (1998) , and it allows estimating the effect of financial development on a particular set of individuals, the self-employed, after having controlled for the effect on the whole population and for country-year fixed effects. Our main interest is in the coefficient δ, which describes how financial development affects the job satisfaction of the self-employed relative to (full-time) employees. 18 When δ is positive, we say that financial development is positively correlated with entrepreneurial utility. Table 3 reports our estimates on the full sample. The first column includes only the controls X i,c,t . Self-employed, old, married, and well-educated individuals tend to be more satisfied with their jobs. The second column describes our most basic specification, as reported in equation (14). The 17 Since these errors may reflect common components within countries and employment status groups, we cluster standard errors at the country/employment status level. 18 To facilitate the interpretation of our coefficients, part-time employees and farmers are excluded from the analysis. These exclusions do not change our results. For the same reason, in what follows, we report the estimates from OLS regressions. The results using ordered probit are qualitatively the same (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004 for a methodological discussion). Finally, these results are robust to the use of different sampling weights. The coefficient estimates and the standard errors for FD × SE are multiplied by 100. The coefficient estimates and the standard errors for GDP × SE are multiplied by 1,000. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-employment status level, are in brackets. * , * * , and * * * denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. coefficient δ is positive and statistically significant. Financial development benefits the self-employed more than the employees.
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In order to check the robustness of this result, we first try to identify whether financial development is capturing any effect of better macroeconomic conditions, like better institutions or economic perspectives, which may have a differential impact on the self-employed. When we include GDP per capita, interacted with the employment status dummy, the effect of financial development becomes slightly weaker but still highly significant (column 3). Adding other macroeconomic variables like GDP growth (column 4), unemployment (column 5), and an index of regulatory pressure (column 6), always interacted with the self-employment dummy, does not change the estimate of δ. Hence, our preferred specification, which serves as the baseline for the next analysis, is the one in column 3.
We then check whether this pattern is confirmed when using a variable based on the percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks (BANK), a measure of the development of the banking sector. This variable can be employed as either an instrument for financial development, as in Aghion, Fally, and Scarpetta (2007) (see table 4 ) or an alternative measure of financial development (reduced form). The results in column 7 show that this measure of financial development is also positively correlated with entrepreneurial utility.
In addition, despite the fact that endogeneity may be less of a concern in our specifications, in that we estimate how a macrovariable affects an individual variable and we include country-year fixed effects, we investigate whether our estimates may be biased, for example, due to omitted variables, by using instrumental variables. In line with the previous literature, we instrument financial development with legal origin (as in several papers, surveyed in Levine, 2005) , with the level of trust (as in Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004) and, as already mentioned, with the variable BANK. While these results should be interpreted with caution due to well-known issues of finding valid instruments for financial development, we nonetheless notice that they are consistent with the previous estimates (see table 4 ). 19 Our next set of regressions estimates whether the effect of financial development depends on the country's stage of development. We divide the sample into country-years with high and with low financial development, where this threshold is determined by the median value in our sample. 20 The results are in columns (1) and (2) of table 5: the effects of financial development on entrepreneurial utility are positive and significant only in less developed countries.
Our model suggests a possible explanation for this result. In less developed countries, individuals become self-employed either because of their motivation or for lack of salaried jobs. As these countries develop their financial system, more jobs 19 The only difference is that the effect of financial development does not appear statistically significant when instrumented by the variable LEGAL alone. This is probably due to the poor fit of this variable in the first stage, as shown by the F-statistic. 20 Splitting the sample according to the mean gives the same qualitative results. This table reports the results of IV regressions with job satisfaction as the dependent variable. All regressions include country-year dummies. The coefficient estimates and the standard errors for FD × SE are multiplied by 100. The F-statistic refers to the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the excluded instrument is equal to 0 in the first stage. Hansen J-test reports the p-values of Hansen overidentification test, under the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-employment status level, are in brackets. * , * * , and * * * denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. In columns 1 and 2, Low FD and High FD indicate that the sample is restricted to countries respectively below and above the median value of FD in our sample (equal to 71.78). Similarly, in columns 3 and 4, High UNEMPL and Low UNEMPL indicate that the sample is restricted to countries, respectively, above and below the median value of UNEMPL in our sample (equal to 8.2); and in columns 5 and 6, High MINWAGE and Low MINWAGE indicate that the sample is restricted to countries, respectively, with and without a mandatory minimum wage. The coefficient estimates and the standard errors for FD × SE are multiplied by 100. The coefficient estimates and the standard errors for GDP × SE are multiplied by 1,000. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-employment status level, are in brackets. * , * * , and * * * denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. are created so only those who value it the most remain selfemployed. This composition effect is weaker in more developed countries, where labor demand is higher and so most individuals become self-employed by choice. Indeed, we get similar findings if we split the sample according to unemployment (UNEMPL; columns 3 and 4) or to whether the country has a mandatory minimum wage (MINWAGE; columns 5 and 6). The effect of financial development on entrepreneurial utility is stronger in countries where unemployment is high and there is a minimum wage. 21 Finally, to highlight the 282 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Low FD and High FD indicate that the sample is restricted to countries, respectively, below and above the median value of FD in our sample (equal to 71.78). The coefficient estimates and the standard errors for FD × SE are multiplied by 100. The coefficient estimates and the standard errors for GDP × SE are multiplied by 1,000. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-employment status level, are in brackets. * , * * , and * * * denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. nonlinearity in the effects of financial development, column 7 includes the level of financial development squared and cubed. The first appears to be negative, the second positive, and both are significant.
From these results, it is evident that the self-employed enjoy higher utility than the employees only in countries with high financial development; in less developed countries, entrepreneurial utility increases with financial development. In highly developed countries, approximately those above the sample median, the effect of financial development is U-shaped, and it appears not statistically significant if one applies a linear model.
C. Mechanisms
We now explore the mechanisms underlying the relation between financial development and entrepreneurial utility. As stressed in our model, these mechanisms should not be evaluated only in monetary terms.
We start by enriching the set of regressors in equation (14). First, we control for income in the full sample and separating country-years according to their level of financial development. As shown in columns 1 to 3 of table 6, if anything, the results are even stronger. Income appears to be a major determinant of job satisfaction; but as Benz and Frey (2004) have also observed, higher income does not explain entrepreneurial utility. In addition to the existing literature, we document that the effects of financial development on entrepreneurial utility are not only monetary. 22 22 Note that while income underreporting may be more of an issue for the self-employed, this could explain our results only if underreporting was higher in more financially developed countries.
To get further evidence along these lines, we estimate equation (14) with income as dependent variable. Results appear in Table 7 . We observe that the self-employed are richer than the employees in less developed countries, while this is not the case in more developed countries (columns 1 and 2). Moreover, financial development decreases the income of the self-employed, relative to the income of the employees (column 3), and this effect tends to be stronger in less developed countries (columns 4 and 5). The fact that financial development reduces profits is consistent with our model in that financial development increases competition, in either the product or the labor market.
The results in columns 4 and 5 of table 7 and those in columns 1 and 2 of table 5 are used to draw figure 1, which summarizes our main results so far. It clearly emerges that the effects of financial development on entrepreneurial utility may differ from those on profit; actually, in our case, these effects go in exactly the opposite direction. Entrepreneurial utility increases with financial development, while profit decreases. Moreover, both effects tend to be stronger in less developed countries.
The results suggest that financial development works through nonmonetary aspects of job satisfaction. To better identify these mechanisms, we include in our regressions variables such as the degree of pride in one's work, the satisfaction with job security, and the degree of independence enjoyed in the job. We also control for work-related beliefs such as how important work is in one's life, the main reason that one works, and so on. None of these variables significantly affects our results, with the exception of independence, an indicator derived from the question, "How free are you to make decisions in your job?" The importance of this variable This table reports the results of OLS regressions with income as the dependent variable. All regressions include country-year dummies. Low FD and High FD indicate that the sample is restricted to countries, respectively, below and above the median value of FD in our sample (equal to 71.78). The coefficient estimates and the standard errors for FD × SE are multiplied by 100. The coefficient estimates and the standard errors for GDP × SE are multiplied by 1,000. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-employment status level, are in brackets. * , * * , and * * * denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. in explaining entrepreneurial utility has already been pointed out by Benz and Frey (2004) . In our sample as well, being self-employed becomes negatively related to job satisfaction when we add this control (table 6, column 4). We observe that once independence has been controlled for, the effect of financial development almost halves in magnitude and is not statistically significant (column 5). Hence, our results add to the existing evidence by documenting that most of the effects of financial development seem to work through this channel. According to the model, this is the case because financial development offers to the most motivated individuals the opportunity to become entrepreneurs. Indeed, these results suggest that what we have so far called motivation may be broadly defined in terms of taste for independence at work. Moreover, the coefficient on independence in less developed countries is lower than in more developed countries (columns 5 and 6). 23 This suggests that as in our model, independence in more developed countries is given to those who value it the most.
VI. Conclusion and Policy Implications
We started the analysis by examining the argument that entrepreneurs enjoy higher utility than employees due to a lack of financial development. This argument has not found support in our data; on the contrary, we have shown that financial development increases utility differences between the self-employed and employees. Moreover, this effect is not explained by increased profits; rather, it seems to work through nonmonetary dimensions of job satisfaction and, in particular, independence. We have interpreted these findings by building a simple occupational choice model in which financial development favors both job creation and a better matching between individual motivation and occupation.
According to our results, the existence of utility differences is not due to some market imperfection, and as such does not in itself call for policy intervention. By highlighting how financial development affects also nonmonetary dimensions of entrepreneurial utility instead, the results point toward other policy implications. First, they bring an additional reason to promote an efficient financial system. Second, from the viewpoint of promoting entrepreneurship, they suggest that recognizing the importance of entrepreneurs' intrinsic motivation does not imply that external conditions do not matter. It then appears that a broader investigation on how different markets and institutions affect nonmonetary returns from a job would be of great interest for both researchers and policymakers. 
